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Measuring the Effects  of Mandated Disclosure
Allen Ferrell
I. INTRODUCTION
A  recurring debate among corporate  and securities  law scholars  is whether
mandated  disclosure, the heart of U.S.  securities regulation,  is necessary.  One
set of commentators  contends  that  market forces will  generally  ensure that the
optimal level  of disclosure  occurs  without any regulatory  intervention.1  Other
scholars  have defended  mandated  disclosure  as both  necessary  and beneficial
focusing on informational  externalities  associated with firm disclosures.'  What
is needed  at this  point in  the debate  is  more  empirical  research  on the actual
effects of mandated disclosure.
The  "classic"  econometric  studies  of mandated disclosure,  heavily  relied
upon and debated by  legal  academics  in their analysis  of mandated  disclosure,
consist largely of three studies:  George  Stigler's 1964 study; George  Benston's
1973  study;  and Carol  Simon's  1989  study.3  All  three  studies analyzed  either
the effect the  Securities Act of 1933  (Stigler and Simon)  or the Exchange  Act
of  1934  (Benston)--collectively  known  as  the Securities  Acts-had  on  stock
prices.
Stigler  examined  the  stock price  performance  of new  stock  issues  before
and  after  the  Securities  Act  of  1933.4  Benston  examined  the  impact  of  the
Exchange  Act of 1934  on a sample of 466 NYSE-listed firms which he divided
into  two  groups:  290  firms  that  were  already  disclosing  sales  information
before  passage  of the  Exchange  Act  of 1934  mandated  such  disclosures  (the
"disclosure  group") and a group of 176 firms that were not (the "non-disclosure
group"). 5 Simon examined, as Stigler did, the performance of new issues before
and  after the  Securities  Act  of 1933.6  She  divided  her sample  into  seasoned
1.  See Roberta Romano,  Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107
YALE  L.J.  2359  (1998);  Roberta  Romano,  The  Need for  Competition in  International Securities
Regulation,  2 THEORETICAL  INQUIRIES 387 (2001).
2.  See,  e.g.,  Merritt  Fox,  Retaining Mandatory Disclosure: Why  Issuer Choice  is not  Investor
Empowerment, 85  VA. L. REv.  1335  (1999).
3.  There are  also  several  important  recent  studies on the effects of mandatory  disclosure  in cross-
country studies. See e.g.,  Rafael LaPorta  et al., What  Works in  Securities Regulation?,  (2004)  (working
paper),  available at http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/papers/seurities_090
7.pdf (last
visited Dec. 21,2004).
4.  George  Stigler, Public  Regulation of  the Securities Markets, 37 J.  Bus. 117  (1964).
5.  George  Benston,  Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: An  Evaluation of the Securities
Exchange Act ofl934, 63 AM. ECON.  REv. 132 (1973).
6.  Carol  Simon,  The Effect of the 1933 Securities  Act on Investor Information and  the Performance
of  New Issues, 79 AM.  ECON.  REV. 295 (1989).Berkeley Business Law Journal
NYSE  companies,  unseasoned  NYSE  companies,  seasoned  non-NYSE
companies, and unseasoned non-NYSE companies.
Finally,  a  recent  empirical  study  by  myself,  building  on  this  literature,
looked  at  the  effects  of the  1964  imposition  of mandated  disclosure  on  the
over-the-counter  market,  the  only other fundamental  change  in the U.S.  in the
scope of mandated disclosure besides the original Securities Acts.7
This  piece  will  argue  that  Stigler,  Benston,  and  Simon's  failure  to
convincingly  arbitrate  the  debate  over  mandated  disclosure  is  largely
attributable to  two shortcomings:  (1) a lack of convincing  theory justifying the
particular  measures  of stock price performance  employed  in these studies;  and
(2)  the inability to control for changing market conditions when comparing  pre-
and post-mandated  disclosure periods.
Part II will  discuss the main potential benefit of mandated disclosure  in the
United  States emphasized  by advocates  of mandated  disclosure:  greater  stock
price  accuracy.  Part III  will then discuss the  lack of theory  connecting  stock
price accuracy to the various aspects of stock market performance  measured in
the  empirical  literature.  After  this  discussion,  Part  IV  will  conclude  by
addressing the second main shortcoming  of the empirical literature:  the lack of
adequate  controls  to  distinguish  time-series  effects  from  the  effects  of
mandated disclosure laws.
II. THE BENEFITS OF STOCK PRICE ACCURACY
As  a conceptual  matter,  an important test  for whether mandated disclosure
"works"  is whether  the  informational  content of stock prices,  post-mandated
disclosure,  is greater than it would otherwise have been. The more information
is impounded  into the price of a stock,  the more the  price of a  stock correctly
anticipates  the  future  prospects  of the  company.  The  concept  of  stock price
accuracy  is  well  accepted  and  commonly  employed  in  the  accounting  and
finance  literature.  Following  Merritt  Fox,  I  will  refer  to  the  level  of
informational content of stock prices as "stock price accuracy."
Improved  stock  price  accuracy  is  potentially  valuable  for  at  least  two
separate  reasons.  First,  to  the  extent  that  capital  is  allocated  based  on stock
prices,  the  more  accurate  stock  prices  are,  the  better that  allocation  will  be.
"Better"  in this context means that capital  will be more likely to be allocated to
7.  Allen  Ferrell,  Mandated  Disclosure  and  Stock  Returns:  Evidence  from  the  Over-the-Counter
Market  (December  2003)  (Harvard  Law  and  Economics  Discussion  Paper  No.  453),  available  at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cftn?abstractid-500123.  See  also  Michael  Greenstone  et  al.,  The
Effects of Equity  Market  Regulation:  Evidence  from the Securities  Acts  Amendments  of 1964 (2004)
(MIT  Department  of  Economics  Working  Paper  No.  04-33),  available  at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=597142  (last visited Dec.  21, 2004).
8.  See  generally  Merritt  B.  Fox,  Securities  Disclosure  in  a  Globalizing  Market:  Who  Should
Regulate  Whom,  95  MICH. L. REv. 2498, 2540 (1997).
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the  highest-valued  user of that  capital.  Second,  to  the  extent  that  corporate
governance decisions depend on the accuracy of stock prices, the more accurate
stock  prices  are,  the  better  corporate  governance  will  be.  Economists  often
focus on the first reason while legal academics commonly  focus on the second.
A.  Capital  Allocation and Stock Prices
Measuring  the  extent  to  which  investment  decisions  are  driven  by  stock
prices has proven very difficult. Any given investment  decision might be based
on  stock  prices  or,  alternatively,  could  be  based  on  the  underlying  business
fundamentals.  Separating  the two is not easy if stock prices actually reflect, as
is  likely the case, business  fundamentals.  This is a pressing problem,  as  stock
prices  are traditionally  thought of as reflecting  the marginal  product  of capital,
a concept that captures the business fundamentals that should ideally be driving
investment  decisions. 9 A central question, then, is whether  fundamentals  drive
investment  decisions  solely,  or,  alternatively,  whether  stock  prices  play  an
independent role in affecting investment.
Different  studies  have  applied  various  techniques  in trying to  disentangle
the  two, arriving  at different  conclusions  on  the  extent to  which  stock prices
factor into investment  decisions.  Some researchers  have found that stock prices
play  only  a  limited  role  in  investment  decisions.' 0  Other  researchers,  in
contrast,  have  found  that  stock  prices  can  play  an  important  role  in  the
allocation of capital.'
Recent  empirical  research,  however, has  been  supportive  of the view  that
stock prices  can matter for  investment  decisions.' 2 An interesting  recent study
by Durnev, Morck, and Yeung investigated  the relationship between  the  stock
price  accuracy  of  an  industry's  stock  and  the  allocation  of  capital  in  that
industry. 13 The  study  used  firm-specific  stock price  variation  as a  proxy  for
stock price accuracy. Firm-specific  stock price variation is the fraction of stock
price variation  that is left "unexplained" by  some baseline  asset-pricing model,
such as the CAPM.  Such variations cannot be attributed to broader fluctuations
in the  markets, and are,  hence,  firm  specific.  Using this proxy  for  stock price
accuracy  they  found  in  this  study  that  capital  was  allocated  with  greater
precision in industries with more accurate  stock prices.
9.  See S.  Fischer & R.C. Merton, Macroeconomics and the Role of  the Stock Market,  21  CARNEGIE
ROCHESTER  SERIES ON PUBLIC POLICY  57 (1984).
10.  See 0.  Blanchard et al.,  The Stock Market, Profit,  and Investment, 108 Q. J. ECON.  115 (1993).
11.  See R. Barro,  The Stock Market and Investment, 3  REv. FIN.  STUD.  115 (1990).
12.  See generally Jeremy  Stein,  Agency,  Information  and Corporate  Investment,  (2001)  (working
paper) (surveying empirical evidence).
13.  See Art  Dumev  et  al.,  Value Enhancing Capital  Budgeting and Firm Specific Stock  Return
Variation, 59 J. FN. 65  (2004).Berkeley Business Law Journal
B. Corporate  Governance
Researchers  have also inquired  into the second potential effect of improved
stock price  accuracy:  improved corporate governance.  One  important corporate
governance  mechanism  is  mergers  and  acquisitions,  which  can  serve  as  an
important  disciplinary  device. 1 4  Shleifer  and  Vishny  argue  that  the  cost  of
equity-which  is  derived  from  stock prices-is  an important  variable  capable
of helping to  explain  the  incidence  of merger and  acquisition  activity  across
industries  and  over  time.15  Likewise,  the  effectiveness  of  executive
compensation, another important corporate governance mechanism,  depends on
stock prices accurately reflecting an individual  firm's success.
In short, more accurate stock prices can serve the dual function of ensuring
better investment decisions and improving corporate governance.
I1. THE LACK OF THEORY
Given the potential importance of stock price accuracy for the allocation  of
capital and corporate governance,  there is a real need for proxies for stock price
accuracy.  Unfortunately, the job of empirical  researchers has been frustrated, to
a certain extent, by a lack of theory that could help identify good proxies. What
has  been  measured  to  date  are  stock returns,
16  stock  volatility,
17  the  cross-
sectional  variance  of stock  returns,
18  and,  in two  recent  studies,  stock  return
synchronicity measures.19  A solid theoretical connection  between  these proxies
and stock price  accuracy would be quite useful.
This  Part will  examine  the possible  theoretical  bases  for the  use of these
different measures.
A. Stock Returns
All three of the classic econometric studies, as well as my own study of the
effect  of the Securities  Act Amendments  of 1964,  looked at changes  in  stock
returns  pre-  and  post-mandated  disclosure.  Each  had  different  assumptions
about  how mandated disclosure  would manifest itself in stock  returns.  Stigler
reasoned  that  the  purpose  of mandated  disclosure  is  to  improve  shareholder
welfare  and,  therefore,  a  natural  place  to  look  is  the  relationship  between
14.  See e.g. Frank Easterbrook  and Daniel Fischel,  The Proper  Role of  a Target's  Management in
Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARv. L. REV.  1161  (1981).
15.  A. Shleifer  and R. Vishny, Stock Market Driven Acquisitions, 70 J. FIN.  ECON. 295  (2003).
16.  See, e.g., Ferrell, supra note 7.
17.  See, e.g.,  George  Benston,  Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 63  AM.  ECON. REV.  132 (1973).
18.  See, e.g.,  Carol  Simon,  The  Effect of the 1933 Securities Act on Investor Information and the
Performance of  New Issues, 79 AM.  ECON.  REV. 295 (1989).
19.  See  Ferrell,  supra note  7;  Merritt  Fox  et  al.,  Law,  Share Price Accuracy and Economic
Performance: The New Evidence, MiCt.  L. REv. (forthcoming).
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mandated disclosure  and stock returns. Benston reasoned  that if managers were
adequately disclosing pre-mandated disclosure,  then mandated disclosure  might
be  viewed  by  investors  as  imposing  a  net  cost  on  the  firm,  which  would
manifest itself in lower stock returns. Given the consistent use of stock returns
in  the  literature,  I  also  measured  stock  returns  pre-  and  post-mandated
disclosure.
20
All  four  studies  (including  Carol  Simon's  study  that  looked  at  the
dispersion  of  stock  returns)  controlled  for  market  fluctuations  in  order  to
determine  whether  stock  returns  were  affected  by the imposition  of mandated
disclosure.  Stigler  compared  the average  returns  on  new  stock  issues  floated
between  1925  and  1929  with those  issued in  1949-1953.  He deflated  the  ratio
of the value of the new-issues portfolio by the value of a broad market index to
control  for market  fluctuations. Benston used a market model that enabled him
to also  control for fluctuations  in the overall market. Simon  and I used  a more
extensive  specification  of  the  return  generating  process  enabling  them  to
control  for  overall  market  fluctuations,  time  effects,  and  industry  effects.  In
addition, I included additional controls for book-to-market  effects and firm size
effects.  Both  Simon  and  I also  used an  alternative  specification  of abnormal
returns-net-of-market  returns  (individual  stock  return  minus  the  market
return)-as a robustness check.
Stigler  and  Benston  found  no  differences  in  stock  returns  pre-  and  post-
mandated  disclosure  after employing  their various  controls.  Simon found that
the stock returns of NYSE-traded  issuers, unseasoned  as well as seasoned, was
statistically identical pre- and post-mandated disclosure. However, I tested both
the change in average abnormal  as well as the median abnormal  return pre- and
post-mandated  disclosure  and found  evidence  consistent  with  an  increase  in
stock prices resulting from mandated disclosure.
2 1
These findings raise two questions.  First, are changes  in abnormal returns a
good test  for whether  or  not mandated  disclosure  is  beneficial?  Second,  are
changes  in  the  abnormal  returns  pre-  and  post-mandated  disclosure  a  good
proxy for stock price accuracy?
Asset pricing theory implies that the expected return on an asset is the risk-
free  rate  of return  plus a premium  based  on the  risk inherent  in  holding  that
asset. In order for changes  in stock returns  to  serve as a proxy  for changes  in
stock price  accuracy,  one would need to  show that stock price  accuracy  has a
meaningful effect on the risk-free  rate of return or the premium associated with
holding undiversifiable  risk. This effect is neither straightforward  nor obvious.
Further  explanation  of the  mechanisms  by  which  mandated  disclosure  affect
stock prices would therefore be useful.
20.  Ferrell, supra note  7.
21  Id.Berkeley Business Law Journal
It  is  possible,  of  course,  that  in  the  immediate  aftermath  of mandated
disclosure companies  would experience  stock price changes as new information
came  to  light.  However,  this  does  not  mean  that  the  average  stock  price
reaction  would  be  positive  or  negative.  The  value  of some  firms  might  be
revised  downward  after  negative  information  is  released  while  other  firms
might  experience  upward  revisions  after  investors  realize  there  is  no
unreleased, or concealed, negative information.
Such  reasoning  suggests  that  one  possible  test  for  determining  whether
mandated disclosure is resulting  in new information being released-and hence
improving  stock  price accuracy-is  the change  in the dispersion  of abnormal
returns in the immediate  aftermath of mandated disclosure. There are,  however,
several  other candidates  for explaining  how  stock  returns  are  affected  by  the
release of new information required by  a mandated disclosure regime.
One possibility  developed  in  the accounting  literature  is the potential that
there is "estimation"  risk when an investor purchases a stock for which there  is
inadequate  information.
22  Because  the  CAPM  model  assumes  a  security's
payoff distribution is known by investors, this estimation risk is not reflected  in
the traditional CAPM model.
An  open question  concerning  whether estimation  risk  is  significant  or not
has centered  on whether estimation  risk is  diversifiable  or not. This  remains a
point  of  debate  in  the  literature,  with  some  commentators  arguing  that
estimation risk  should be  diversifiable  given the  breadth of modem  securities
markets.23 If estimation  risk is  diversifiable  then  it  should have  no  affect  on
stock returns. If this is so, then  improvements in stock price accuracy would not
affect stock returns or prices through reducing estimation risk.
A second possibility, explored by Amihud and Mendelson  among others,  is
that  more  information leads  to a  reduction  in  bid-ask  spreads.4  The  adverse
selection component of the bid-ask spread, a well-established component of the
bid-ask spread, should fall  as more information becomes publicly known about
a stock.  Reduced  bid-ask spreads, in turn, should result in lower stock returns
as the transaction  costs  facing investors  are reduced.  Of course,  at the time the
bid-ask  spreads  are  reduced,  stock  prices  should  increase  capitalizing  the
savings to investors resulting from smaller bid-asks spreads  in the future.
B. Stock Volatility Over Time
Stigler,  Benston,  and  Ferrell  also  measured  the  effect  of  mandated
22.  See generally Peter Clarkson  et al.,  On the Diversification, Observability,  and Measurement of
Estimation  Risk, 31  J. FIN.  & QUANTITATIVE  ANALYSIS  69 (1996).
23.  Id.
24.  See Yakov  Amihud  &  Haim  Mendelson,  Asset Pricing and the Bid-Ask Spread, 17  ..  FIN.
ECON.  223 (1986).
25.  See generally MAUREEN O'HARA,  MARKET  MICROSTRUCTURE THEORY (1995).
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disclosure  on  the  volatility  of abnormal  returns  of stocks  over  time.  Stigler
found that stock return volatility was significantly lower in the period following
the  passage  of the  Securities  Act  of  1933.  Benston  measured  the  effect  of
mandated  disclosure  on  the  volatility  of  abnormal  returns-those  returns
unexplained  by  the  market  model.  He  found  that  the  variance  of securities
prices declined substantially after the imposition of mandated disclosure. At the
same  time,  he  found  no  statistically  significant  changes  in  the  variance  of
abnormal  returns of stocks in his disclosing and non-disclosing group that  can
be associated with passage of the Exchange Act of 1934.
Many  commentators  have argued that the "most  logical  conclusion to draw
from  this  evidence  is  that  [stock  price  accuracy]  was  enhanced  and  that
investors  thereby  benefited.'
,
26  This  argument  ignores,  however,  the  fact  that
Benston  found  no  statistically  significant  differences  between  the  reaction  of
the  disclosure  group  to  mandated  disclosure  and  the  non-disclosure  group.
Benston  reported that  the change  in  variance  was  "almost  the  same  for those
corporations that were and were  not affected by the Act."27
On the other hand,  I found that the volatility of abnormal  stock  returns in
the  over-the-counter  ("OTC") market  experienced  a  substantial decline  in  the
post-mandated  disclosure  period.
28  The  control  group,  exchange-listed
companies,  actually  experienced  an increase  in volatility in the  post-mandated
disclosure  period.  As  a  result,  the  volatility  of listed  and  OTC  stock  returns
were  virtually  identical  in  the  period  following  the  imposition  of mandated
disclosure  on  OTC  firms.  In  contrast,  in  the  pre-mandated  disclosure  period
OTC volatility was significantly higher than that of the listed market.
However, the  findings  on volatility, while  suggestive, beg the question:  is
decreased  variance  necessarily  indicative  of  improved  stock  price  accuracy?
We  still need  a convincing theoretical  framework  connecting  the two  in  order
to interpret the empirical  findings. Consider the following four possibilities and
their  differing  predictions  concerning  the  relationship  between  volatility  and
stock price accuracy.
1. All Information is Revealed Eventually
One could  easily  imagine  a model  where  all  information, good as well  as
bad, is eventually revealed even if disclosure is not mandated.  In such a model,
managers  might  be  able  to  hide  information  for  a  while,  but  eventually
investors will learn the true state of affairs. If a customer cancels a large order,
26.  John  C.  Coffee,  Jr.,  Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure
System, 70 VA. L. REv.  717, 735-36 (1984).
27.  George J.  Benston, Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934,63 AM. ECON.  REV.  132,  149 (1973).
28.  See Ferrell, supra note 7.Berkeley Business Law Journal
say, management might be able to hide the bad news for a while, but eventually
investors  will  learn  of  the  effect  of  the  cancellation  on  the  company's
profitability, even if  only through a bankruptcy filing.
The imposition  of mandated disclosure  in such a model  might result in the
possible  release  of information  at  a  date  earlier  than  would  have  otherwise
occurred  (and, hence, improve stock price  accuracy).  Any piece of information
will eventually be revealed and, at that point, will affect the stock price.
One  potentially  useful  implication  of such  a  model  is  that  mandated
disclosure, after the initial adjustment period is over, will produce fewer "stock
blow-ups,"  i.e.,  stocks  with  very  large  negative  abnormal  returns  in a  single
month.  Without  disclosure,  management  may  conceal  deteriorating  company
conditions,  surprising  investors  with  dramatically  bad  news.  Disclosure
suggests that such negative information  about a company will be released more
gradually  over time.  I found  that there  were in fact  fewer "stock  blow-ups"  in
the OTC  market after mandated  disclosure was imposed.29  Conversely,  during
the  period immediately  following  the  imposition of mandated  disclosure  (the
adjustment period)  there  might,  in  fact,  be more  "stock  blow-ups"  given  the
sudden forced revelation of bad news that managers had been  able  to conceal
until that point.
3 0
2. Mean Reversion in Fundamental  Value
Some  scholars  have  suggested  that  the  firm-specific  component  of
fundamental firm value is mean reverting. 31 If there is mean-reversion, then it is
possible that firm-specific  information will eventually  become,  over time, stale
and uninformative.  This would imply that mandated disclosure  could increase
variance  above  what  it  would  otherwise  be  as  well  as  increase  stock  price
accuracy.  Mandated  disclosure  might ensure that information  is released while
it  is still timely,  and, hence, have an  impact on  stock prices.  In the  absence  of
mandated disclosure, that information might not have been released until it was
stale and uninformative,  and hence have no impact on stock prices. While there
is no current evidence  that such mean reversion does or does not take place, the
topic is an active area of research.
3. Constant Discount  Rates
Academics  have  also  done  rigorous  theoretical  work  on  the  effects  of
adding  a constant  discount  rate  to a model  where  all  information  is revealed
eventually.  Such  research  takes  into  account  the  fact  that  the  future  cash-
29.  Id.
30,  See Fox, supra  note  19.
31.  See Art  Dumev  et  al.,  Value  Enhancing Capital Budgeting and Firm Specific Stock Return
Variation, 59 J. FiN.  65, 95  (2004).
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flows/profits  of  a  firm  are  discounted  by  market  participants  into  current
dollars.  Models by  West
32  and LeRoy and Porter33 indicate  that the release  of
information on a more timely basis would, in fact, reduce stock return volatility
in  a  world  where  all  information  is  eventually  released.  More  timely
information about future cash-flows/profits of the company  will have less of an
impact  on return  volatility than would information  released  at  a later point in
time,  as  the  cash-flows/profits  are  more  heavily  discounted  earlier  in  time.
Interestingly,  these  models  also  indicate  that while  more  timely  information
reduces return volatility,  it  actually increases  the volatility  of the  stock price
level. These interesting  predictions underscore  the need to  formalize intuitions
concerning the impact of mandated disclosure on stock returns and prices under
different assumptions.
4. Noise Associated with Information
Alternatively,  one could also have a model that would lead one to associate
increased variance  with  improved  stock price  accuracy.  This  could occur in a
model  in which there  is  a noise  trader  reaction  associated  with the release  of
information. 34  In  other  words,  the  stock  price  reaction  to  the  release  of
information  would  have  two  components:  a  reevaluation  of the  company's
prospects  in  light  of new  information  and  the price  impact  of noise  traders.
Depending  on  how the  noise component  is  modeled,  it  is possible  to  have  a
situation  in  which  increased  variance  of stock  prices  is  associated  with  an
increase  in  stock  price  accuracy.  Of  course,  improved  stock  price  accuracy
would result only if the price impact of noise traders was not too large relative
to the price impact of the new information.
C. Cross-Sectional Variance
In  her  study  of the  effect  of the  Securities  Act  of  1933  on  stock  price
behavior, Carol  Simon used the cross-sectional  variance of abnormal returns as
a  proxy  for  stock  price  accuracy.35  For  each  stock  in  the  pre-mandated
disclosure  period (pre-1933),  she  calculated  the  abnormal  return  for  a  given
period  of time,  again  controlling  for  market, industry,  and  time  effects.  She
then calculated the variance  of the abnormal returns  for stocks  in the pre-  and
post-mandated disclosure  period for four groups:  seasoned NYSE-listed firms;
unseasoned  NYSE  firms;  seasoned  non-NYSE  firms;  and  unseasoned  non-
32.  See Kenneth D. West, Dividend Innovations and Stock Price Volatility, 56 ECONOMETRICA  37
(1988).
33.  Stephen  F.  LeRoy  &  Richard D. Porter,  The Present-  Value Relation: Tests Based on Implied
Variance Bounds, 49 ECONOMETRICA  555 (1981).
34.  See Fox, supra note 19.
35.  See Carol  J.  Simon,  The  Effect of the  1933  Securities Act  on Investor Information and the
Performance  of New Issues, 79 AM. ECON. REv. 295 (1989).Berkeley Business Law Journal
NYSE-listed  firms.  By  comparing  the  variance  of the  abnormal  returns  for
these  four  groups  pre-  and  post-mandated  disclosure,  Simon  found  that  the
variance  of  abnormal  returns  was  smaller  in  the  post-mandated  disclosure
period for unseasoned non-NYSE-listed firms.
Simon gives  the following  intuitive justification  for using  the  variance  of
abnormal  returns  as  a  proxy  for  stock  price  accuracy:  "The  availability  of
quality information will..,  affect the riskiness of [stocks].  As such, the effects
of legislation  aimed  at  increasing  investor  information  should be  reflected  in
changes  in the dispersion of market-adjusted  returns., 36 This justification  is, at
best, incomplete,  as  it fails  to  connect  the cross-sectional  variance  of returns
with  an explanation  of how increased  information at an earlier  period of time
interacts  with the dispersion of abnormal  returns. As before,  the nature  of this
interaction  will  depend  on one's assumptions  concerning  discount rates, when
information  is revealed if disclosure is not mandated,  and, possibly, the actions
of noise traders.
While  the  theoretical  connection  between  the  cross-sectional  variance  of
abnormal  returns and stock price accuracy  is undeveloped,  Simon's results are
consistent  with  the  view that  there  is  such  a  connection.  She  found  that  the
seasoned  NYSE  firms  had  the  lowest  cross-sectional  variance  of abnormal
returns,  followed by unseasoned  NYSE firms,  then seasoned  non-NYSE  firms
and,  finally,  unseasoned  non-NYSE  firms.  Unseasoned  firms  had the largest
variance  of abnormal  returns  of  all  four  groups.37  The  fact  that  seasoned
NYSE-listed  firms  had  the  smallest  variance  while  unseasoned  non-NYSE
firms had the largest is consistent with using cross-sectional  variance as a proxy
for  stock price  accuracy.  On  a  similar  note,  I  found  that  the  cross-sectional
variance  of abnormal  returns  in  the  OTC  market  pre-mandated  disclosure
(1962-1965)  was  significantly  larger  than  the  cross-sectional  variance  of
abnormal returns in the listed market for the same time period.
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IV. THE LACK OF SATISFACTORY CONTROLS
A  second  shortcoming  of the  empirical  literature  is  its  general  lack  of
control groups that would allow analysis to take into account  changes in  market
conditions over time. Such a lack of adequate controls  is a serious problem with
all three of the "classic"  econometric studies.
A. Stigler Study
Stigler's controls for changing  market fluctuations  are unconvincing.  First,
36.  Id.  at  295.
37.  Id.  at 309.
38.  See Ferrell, supra note 7.
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he  simply divided the new-issues  portfolio value  by a market index  value. He
does  not control  for other factors,  besides the market index,  that might change
over  time. Moreover,  his post-mandated  disclosure  sample  is  from the  1950s,
some twenty years after the passage of the Securities Act of 1933.  Both of these
facts call into serious question his findings given the well-documented  fact that
stock returns and volatility vary significantly over time.
B. Benston Study
As noted  before,  Benston  found  a reduction  in stock-price  variance  in the
Security  Act  of  1933's  post-mandated  disclosure  period.  Did  the  Securities
Acts cause  this reduction  as defenders of mandated disclosure contend or did it
result  from  the  impact  of the  Great  Depression  and  other  changes  in  the
markets over time? This is an extraordinarily  difficult question to answer.
Conceivably,  the  effects  of the  Great  Depression  and the  Securities  Acts
could  be disentangled if a good control group were available. Benston's group
of companies  that  apparently  disclosed  sales  information  voluntarily  before
disclosure  was  mandated  would  arguably  serve  this  function.  The  problems
with  using  this  group  as  a  control,  however,  are  serious.  First,  several
commentators  have  noted  that many  firms in  the non-disclosing  group  did, in
fact, disclose basic  financial information such as  net income and balance sheet
data.39 This throws  into  question  whether the  disclosing group  can  serve  as  a
good control group if it was not all that different from the non-disclosing group.
Second,  commentators  have  argued  that the  important  change wrought  by
the  Securities  Acts  was primarily  in the  liability imposed  for  fraud  and non-
disclosure, given the arguably poor quality of voluntary disclosures. 4 0  The SEC
found, for  instance,  that prior to the  imposition of mandated  disclosure  on the
OTC market, there was a high level of fraud  in the reports that were voluntarily
issued.41  The increased  exposure  to  liability  for  inadequate  disclosure  would
have  affected  both  groups  of  companies.  Both  these  criticisms  raise  the
question  of  whether  measuring  the  differential effect  that  the  disclosure
requirements  of the  Securities  Acts  had  on  Benston's  two  groups  is  a good
measure of the  Acts'  overall effect  on the  capital  markets.  If the two  groups
Benston  uses  are  not  all  that  different,  then  the  differential  effect  of  the
Securities  Acts  on these  two groups would not serve  as a good measure  of the
Acts'  overall effect.
39.  See, e.g. Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why  Issuer Choice Is Not
Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L.REv. 1335,  1373-79  (1999).
40.  Id.
41.  Report of Special  Study of Securities Markets,  H.R. DOC. No. 88-95,  pt. 1, at 151  (1963).Berkeley Business Law Journal
C. Simon Study
Simon's  study  used  a  different  econometric  technique  than  that  of
Benston's  study  to  accomplish  the  goal  of isolating  the  effects  of mandated
disclosure.  Rather  than  using a  control  group,  as  Benston  does,  she  tried to
estimate econometrically  the effect of "bull" and "bear"  markets  on the proxies
for  stock  price  accuracy-most  importantly,  the  cross-sectional  variance  of
abnormal  returns-she  employed.  Simon  measured  how  the  cross-sectional
variance of abnormal  returns varied over three stock market cycles in the  1946-
1960 period.
Isolating the effects  of the Great Depression  is as fundamentally  important
to  Simon's  analysis as it is to  Benston's. The obvious need  to account for the
effects  of the  Great  Depression  are  confirmed  in  her finding  that  the  stock
market as  a whole  experienced  a substantial  reduction  in variance during the
Great Depression.
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However,  there  are  several  problems  with  Simon's  control  approach,
although it is certainly an improvement  over ignoring  the issue. First, the time
period looked at,  1946-1960,  is some  fifteen to twenty  years  after the passage
of the  Securities  Act,  rendering  it  less  useful  as  a  control  group  than  one
tracked in the immediate  aftermath of the  Securities  Act of 1933.  Second, it is
unclear whether  the behavior  of the variance  of abnormal  returns  in  the bear
market of 1957-1958,  for example, will tell us much concerning  the impact  of
the Great Depression  on variance.  These two events  were of entirely different
orders of magnitude and duration.
In  the  end, prudentially,  Simon  concludes  that, "[t]he  coincident  timing of
[the  Great  Depression  and  the  Securities  Acts]  makes  it  difficult  to  fully
disentangle competing hypotheses. 43
D. Ferrell  Study
In terms of controls,  there are  some clear advantages  in studying the  1964
extension of mandated disclosure  to the OTC market. First, throughout the time
period examined (1962-1968)  there was no stock market event anywhere on the
order of the  Great  Depression.  Second,  there  exists  a  natural  control  group.
Exchange-listed  companies  throughout  this  time  period  had  already  been
subject  to mandated  disclosure  requirements  for some  thirty years.  It  was the
OTC  market  that  was  affected  by the  change  in  the  coverage  of mandated
disclosure requirements.
In  the  course  of measuring  volatility,  cross-sectional  variance,  average
stock returns,  and stock return synchronicity,  I  analyzed both the listed market
42.  See Simon, supra note 35, at 309.
43.  Id. at 311.
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and the  OTC market.  One can therefore  control  for changing market conditions
over time by using difference-in-difference  estimators.
V. CONCLUSION
Two  of the  main  potential  advantages  of mandatory  disclosure  are  more
informed  stock  prices  and  better  corporate  governance.  A  crucial  step  in
identifying  the  effects  of  mandatory  disclosure  is  theoretical  and  empirical
work  that  can  enable  empirical  researchers  to  confidentially  use  proxies  for
increases  in the informational  content of stock  prices and  improved  corporate
governance  in  studying  changes  in  mandatory  disclosure  regulation.  Recent
research on mandatory disclosure has started to fill in this gap.Berkeley  Business Law Journal Vol. 1: No. 2,  2004